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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This Article 78 Petition seeks a de novo parole hearing for Petitioner

The

Parole Board’s combined errors, and its failure to provide a legally sufficient explanation for its

denial of Mr.

J’s parole demonstrate that the Board did not apply the requisite legal standards

^

governing parole decision-making and that its denial was arbitrary and capricious.
In 1984, Justice John A. Dillon sentenced Mr.

and thus determined that Mr.

to a minimum term of 25 years to life,

must be considered for parole under the law. Mr.

has

focused the last three and a half decades of his life on improving himself and preparing to be a

contributing member of society upon his release. Yet despite Mr.
Parole has now denied Mr.

’s efforts, the Board of

’s application for parole for a tenth time.

The New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision’s Parole
Board (“the Board”) summarily denied Mr.

’s release in four short paragraphs. The decision

and the process by which the Board arrived at its decision are plagued with myriad errors, the most

egregious of which being the Board’s failure to meaningfully address Mr.

’s minor status

during the commission of the underlying offense, and the Board’s refusal to provide Mr.

as

required by law, with the materials the Board relied on in coming to its decision.
The Board failed to support its denial of release and did not sufficiently discuss specific

issues and statutory factors as required by controlling law, including Mr.

’s youth and its

attendant circumstances at the time of the crime. Instead, the Board summarily concluded that

releasing Mr.|

|would so deprecate the seriousness of the offense so as to undermine respect

for the law. The Board also summarily concluded that release would be incompatible with the
welfare of society, but did not explain how, in light of definitive evidence of Mr.

s

rehabilitation by the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision’s
(“DOCCs”) own metrics, Mr.

would pose a danger to society. In addition, the Board’s

3
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conclusion that Mr.

'ould pose a risk to community safety is inconsistent with the evidence

of rehabilitation, as confirmed by the COMPAS Risk Assessment. The Board failed to explain its
departure from Mr.

^^

s COMPAS assessment, and thus failed to meet its statutory obligations.

During his incarceration, Mr.

addressed the underlying substance abuse issues that

contributed to his crime and participated in various programs not only to better himself, but to help
others. He reflected on his crime, gained insight, and worked tirelessly on self-improvement. Mr.
also works hard to maintain close relationships with individuals who support his efforts for
release and who have repeatedly assured DOCCS that his release will be stable and successful.
Mr.

merits due consideration of his release to parole supervision. The Board’s

summary decision does not evince that he received the consideration to which he was legally
entitled.
Mr.

appeals his denial of parole and is entitled to a de novo parole hearing on the

following grounds: (A) the Board did not sufficiently consider the required statutory and

Constitutional factors in reaching its decision, namely Mr.

’s minor status at the time of the

offense and his achievements during the period of his incarceration; (B) the Board did not provide
Mr.

with a complete record such that he could prepare and address the record during his

interview; (C) the Board did not sufficiently explain its decision to deny Mr.

not explain its departure from Mr.

parole, and did

’s COMPAS report; (D) the Board improperly considered

factors outside of the statute and regulations, such as an amorphous “continual mistrust of

authority” and an “official” letter of opposition from an Assistant District Attorney who did not
prosecute Mr.

s offense, and had an inaccurate understanding of the underlying facts; (E) the

Board placed undue weight on Mr.

’s underlying offense; (F) the repeated denial of Mr.

4
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parole amounts to illegal resentencing; and (G) the “deprecate the seriousness of the crime”

standard is unconstitutionally vague.
Each ground warrants reversal. For these reasons, individually and cumulatively, the
Board’s decision should be reversed and Mr.

|granted immediate release or, in the alternative,

afforded a de novo hearing within 30 days.

VENUE

This action is properly commenced in Albany County because it is the county where
Respondent, the Attorney General of New York State, maintains her principal office and where

the parole decision was made. See CPLR § 506(b).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mr.

^

Jhas been denied parole ten times. This petition challenges the most recent parole

denial on November 13, 2018, after a hearing with the Board of Parole the same day. See Ex. 1,
Parole Decision, November 13, 2018. Mr.

s timely notice of administrative appeal was filed

on November 20, 2018. See Ex. 18, Petitioner’s Administrative Appeal of Parole Denial. On July
25, 2019, the Board of Parole Appeals Unit (“Appeals Unit”) affirmed the Board’s denial of parole.
See Ex. 19, Respondents’ Administrative Appeal Decision, July 25, 2019. Mr.

I has exhausted

his administrative remedies and this matter is ripe for the instant Article 78 proceeding.

5
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr.

J’s incarceration began more than three decades ago. At the time of the underlying

crime, Mr.

|was 17 years old, living on his own without familial support, and suffering from

^

substance abuse. Under the influence of drugs and alcohol, Mr.
whom Mr.

confronted the victim]

jbelieved was responsible for a series of crimes

in the neighborhood, and the two ultimately killed Mr.
old and, in 1984, Mr.

and an acquaintance

Mr.

fas

arrested at 17 years

was convicted of second-degree murder. After a thorough review of

his record, the trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life with the possibility of parole.

^

Since the time that Mr. Hbcgan his sentence, and through programs offered by DOCCS,
Mr.

has focused on his rehabilitation and his future after confinement.
Mr.

Hs record shows that he has volunteered in numerous programs, completed

vocational training, earned certificates and excellent evaluations, and has maintained a job during
his incarceration. Mr.

|has held positions as an administrative clerk, a dining room attendant,

an electrician’s assistant, a food assembler, a grounds maintenance laborer, an inmate mobility
assistant, a level-two porter, a level-two industries worker, a level-two salvage laborer, and a

painter’s assistant. He performed these duties while also participating in the institutional programs

listed below.
During his incarceration, and although he was shuffled from institution to institution, Mr.

^^

Bremained actively involved in DOCCS programs.

^^

eamed his GED
For example, Mr. |

and received college credits; has taken courses in legal research, bible study, wood craft, leather

craft, machinery, shoe repair, art, and medical services; and has attended multiple non-aggression

6
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workshops, alternatives to violence programming, aggression replacement training, and

Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous meetings.
Mr.

|has also worked hard to maintain his relationships with supportive figures in the

community who have repeatedly pledged to help him upon his release. Mr.
assurances from Pastor

andl

received

2

and

that he will have a place to reside upon his release. He has separately

received authorization to reside at HUD-funded housing, specifically the Cephus House. Mr.|
has also received assurances for employment from Pastor|

. Several

and

other relatives and friends both within and outside of New York State have also offered him
employment. They are all looking forward to Mr.|

' s return to society and will provide a stable

support system for Mr.|
Finally, Mr.|

[ s COMPAS report shows that he is low-risk.

Mr.

^^

was scored as

“low risk” for felony violence, arrest, and absconding. See Ex. 13, COMPAS 2018. Furthermore,
Mr.

’s COMPAS report also reflects that he is “job ready” and his “educational needs were

met.” See id. Mr.

|worked hard to developed a comprehensive release plan, including multiple

options for housing arrangements and job opportunities upon his supervised release. He has taken
responsibility for his offense and is prepared to return to society and maintain a law-abiding life,
and his COMPAS Risk Assessment reflects this.

Despite Mr.|

’s accomplishments and his plans for the future, at Mr.

’s most recent

hearing, the Commissioners asked only six questions about his plans for reentry, and spent over

In early September 2019, Mr.
was transferred to Auburn Correctional Facility, where has already immersed
himself in the programs and offerings available to him. For example, he has completed orientation, has been
assigned a job as a hospital porter (morning and afternoon module), visits regularly with parole support systems
available to him, and participates in Inmate Tablet related to JP5S, a new inmate program focused on education,
computer skills, literature, and organizational planning. He participates in the Native American spirituality.
2
Since his transfer to Auburn, Mr
s been able to visit with Pasto
1

7

7 of 27

INDEX NO.

FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/02/2019 05:08 PM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/02/2019
FUSL000115

half the hearing discussing the circumstances surrounding Mr.

J’s underlying offenses without

^

youth played a role. Although Mr.

any attention paid to how

^^

ftried to express how

his young age and immature mentality contributed to his action, the Board only asked two
questions about Mr.

age - one regarding how old he was when he left home to escape his

^^

abusive father, and a second question inquiring as to whether Mr.|
had friends his own age
after he explained he spent most of his time working with adults. See Ex. 2, Nov. 2018 Interview

Transcript, at 7, 8. With these questions, the Board merely established Mr.
of the underlying offense, but did nothing further to analyze the impact of Mr.

|s age at the time
’s youth and

his inability to fully understand the consequences of his actions at that time. The Board asked no
questions about Mr.

’s thought-process at the time, how long he had been abusing alcohol and

drugs and how this may have impacted his development, or if he had adult resources he could turn

to for help. The Board merely listed Mr.

’s “young age when [he] committed [the] crime” as

a factor the Board “also considered.” Ex. 1, at 2.
A review of Mr.

’s parole file also shows that the Board never provided Mr.

materials that he is entitled by law to receive

-

^^

|
the

namely, the community opposition and an

unredacted COMPAS report. This is still the subject of ongoing litigation, because the State has
refused to turn over a letter by an Assistant District Attorney that was referenced in connection

with Mr.

most recent hearing.3 Remarkably, Mr.

^^

|
has never received this letter.

addition to - and likely, in part, because of - the lack of information provided to Mr.

In

>efore

his hearing, the Commissioners based their decision on information that was either erroneous or

outside of the factors set by law.

3 Matter o

^

/

v. NYDOCCS , (3 d Dep’t App. Div. No

|

|)
8
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ARGUMENT
The standard of review for an Article 78 Petition is whether the Board’s decision was

“arbitrary and capricious,” and “irrational bordering on impropriety.” Russo v. N.Y. State Bd. of
Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69 (1980). Thus, the Board’s decision should be reversed where (1) “the
proceedings and/or determination was in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error

of law, was arbitrary and capricious or was otherwise unlawful”; (2) a Board member or members

making the determination “relied on erroneous information as shown in the record of the
proceeding, or relevant information was not available for consideration”; or (3) where “the

determination made was excessive.” See 9 NYCRR § 8006.3(a). In this case, the Board’s decision

was made and the parole interview conducted in violation of law based on erroneous information,
and was arbitrary and capricious.

Specifically, Mr.

| is entitled to a de novo parole hearing because (A) the Board did not

sufficiently consider the required statutory and Constitutional factors in reaching its decision,
namely Mr.

J’s minor status at the time of the offense and his achievements during the period

^

of his incarceration; (B) the Board did not provide Mr.

with a complete record, including

letter of community opposition, such that he could prepare and address the record during his

interview; (C) the Board did not explain its decision to deny Mr.
its departure from Mr.

[ parole, and did not explain

’s COMPAS report; (D) the Board improperly considered factors

outside of the statute and regulations, such as an amorphous “continual mistrust of authority” and

an “official” letter of opposition from an Assistant District Attorney who did not prosecute Mr.
’s offense, and did so based on an inaccurate understanding of the underlying facts; (E) the
Board placed improper weight on Mr.

's

underlying offense; (F) the repeated denial of Mr.

9
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’s parole amounts to illegal resentencing; and (G) the “deprecate the seriousness of the crime”
standard is unconstitutionally vague.

.

A

. J’s Minor Status as Required by Law

The Board Did Not Consider Mr

^^

Under Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A), the Board is required to consider eight statutory

factors and issue determinations that include individualized reasons for its conclusions, including
Mr.

’s institutional record, release plans, and the seriousness of the offense and Mr.

s

activities following arrest prior to confinement. Exec. Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A). In addition, the
Board is required to consider the significance of a parole applicant’s youth and its attendant

circumstances at the time of the commission of the crime before making a parole determination
under the Eighth Amendment and the relevant regulations. See Hawkins v. New York State Dep’t
of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 140 A.D.3d 34, 36 (3d Dep’t 2016); see also Miller v. Alabama ,

567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010). 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(c)

requires the Board to consider “the diminished culpability of youth” and the applicant’s “growth
and maturity since the time of the commitment offense”.
Here, neither the parole interview transcript nor the Board’s written determination reflect

that the Board met its constitutional or statutory obligations to consider Mr.

to the commission of the crime. Mr.

s youth in relation

was only 17 years old when he committed the underlying

crime, for which he was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison.4 See Ex. 2 at 2. During Mr.|

s

interview, and in the decision itself, the Board failed to mention any Eighth Amendment or
regulatory factors. See generally Ex. 1. The Board repeatedly failed to account for Mr.

4

's

Understanding that youth under the age of 18 are not fully developed as adults, and that youthful offenders should
receive rehabilitation services and have the opportunity to reintegrate into their communities, New York State
legislators have passed the Raise the Age law, which no longer automatically charges 16- and 17-year-olds as adults.
See, e. g. New York State Raise the Age, NYLS, Chapter 59, Part WWW (enacted April 10, 2017). Although Mr.
is not eligible under the Raise the Age law, his age nevertheless played a factor in his crimes, and he deserves
to be reintegrated into his community.

10
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minor status when it questioned his relationship with the victim and Mr.|

’s past reluctance to

go to the authorities. See Ex. 2 at 8, 10; Rivera v. Stanford , 172 A.D.3d 872, 875 (2d Dep’t 2019)
(“[f]or those persons convicted of crimes committed as juveniles who, but for a favorable parole

determination will be punished by life in prison, the [Parole] Board must consider youth and its
attendant characteristics in relationship to the commission of the crime at issue.”). The Board’s

failure to account for Mr.

[ s age at the time of the underlying offense is a violation of 9

NYCRR § 8002.2(c) and of the minimal procedural requirement to protect an individual’s rights
under the Eighth Amendment and to ensure that juvenile offenders receive “a meaningful

opportunity to obtain release” at some point in the process. See Graham , 560 U.S. at 75. The
Appeals Unit inexplicably asserts that the Board’s minimalist approach fully satisfied this factor

and that “all required youth matters were addressed.” Ex. 19 at 4. However, both the Board and

the Appeals Unit failed to consider the practical effects Mr.|

' s age had on his mental state and

his actions at the time of the crime.
Had the Board fairly considered that Mr.

was only 17 years old, and living on his own

at the time, they would have better understood why Mr.

was frightened, had no one to turn

to, and made an impulsive decision without recognizing the full repercussions of his conduct. See
Ex. 2 at 8-9. Yet the Board’s decision only skeptically notes that Mr]

was intimidated by Mr.

See Ex. 1 at 2 (“. ..your victim, who you claimed you were scared of and was a criminal in
the neighborhood.”) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Board suggested that Mr.

efforts at age 17 to alert the police through his employer of Mr.

insufficient, and failed to address completely Mr.

’s previous

|’s criminal activity were

’s “susceptibility to peer and familial

pressures.” See Ex. 2 at 10, 12; 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(c)(2). Finally, the Board’s decision makes

11
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no mention of Mr.

I’s demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation in the three decades since the

crime took place.
Although the Board is not obligated to refer to each statutory factor, or to give every factor

equal weight, as the Appeals Unit reiterated, the Board is nevertheless required “to give fair

consideration to each of the applicable statutory factors as to every person who comes before it,
and where the record convincingly demonstrates that the Board did in fact fail to consider the

proper standards, the courts must intervene.” See Matter of King v. New York State Div. of Parole ,
190 A.D.2d 423, 431 (1st Dep’t 1993), aff’d 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994).
Here, the Board failed to give fair consideration to

MrJ

’s institutional record, his release

plans, and his age of at the time of the offense; accordingly, a de novo hearing, or Mr.

immediate release, should be granted.
B.

The Board Did Not Provide Mr. |
for His Parole Hearing

J’s

^

with Necessary Information to Prepare

Parole applicants have the right to access their own case records and the materials

considered by the Board. See Clark v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 2018 WL 1988851, at *3
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018) (finding that the Board’s refusal to disclose the existence of statements of

opposition to an applicant violated the Executive Law and Parole Board Regulations). The Board

may only restrict or withhold this information to the extent that the materials may contain “any
information which if disclosed might result in harm, physical or otherwise, to any person.” See 9
NYCRR § 8000.5(c)(2)(i)(a)(3). This does not allow the Board to deny an applicant’s access to
these materials, but rather means the Board may redact the “individual’s name and address [to

keep them] confidential.” See id; In re Mullins v. NYS Board of Parole, Index No. 52682-2017
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. April 22, 2019) (holding that “if Respondent elects to consider the ‘community

12
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opposition’ in making its parole release decision, then it must provide copies of that documentation
to the Petitioner”).

.

.

Failure to provide letters

1

In its November 2018 decision, the Board states that it received letters of support and

opposition and considered these letters in coming to its decision to deny Mr.

s release. See

Ex. 1 at 2 (“We have reviewed...official letters in support and opposition....”). Notably, the only

opposition letter believed to exist was one written by an Assistant District Attorney who has no
firsthand knowledge of the case. See Ex. 2 at 29; Section D.2. However, the Board failed to

provide any official letter of opposition to Mr.

redacted or otherwise. Mr.

has a right

to the substance of any letter of opposition, albeit with the necessary redactions. The Appeals

Unit asserts that Mr.

( “already has this letter” and therefore the “issue of non-disclosure is

( does not have the letter; he simply knows

moot.” See Ex. 19, at 3. This is inaccurate. Mr.

of its existence. Therefore, the issue is not moot and cannot be swept away so neatly. The Board’s

failure to provide Mr.

all letters submitted in his case, redacted or otherwise, violated Parole

Board Regulations and necessitates a new hearing.

.

2

.

Failure to provide full COMPAS assessment

Additionally, portions of Mr.

^^

’s COMPAS assessment were inappropriately redacted.

See Ex. 13. Questions 24, 29, and 30 were redacted from the COMPAS assessment that was

provided to Mr.

before his parole interview. See id. at 5. When Mr.

|

requested the full

COMPAS report, he did not receive a response from DOCCS until after both his parole interview
and the Board’s decision. See Ex. 14, DOCCS Response, December 24, 2018 at 1. In its response,

DOCCS asserted that the redacted questions were “evaluative in nature, and therefore the answers
under the F.O.I.L.” See id. The New York

to those questions [were] not released to

Freedom of Information Law (“F.O.I.L.”) governs public access to records, not parole applicants’

13
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access to their own files. An applicant’s access to his own COMPAS report—which is part of the

—

parole file cannot be categorically withheld. The Appeals Unit’s assertion that “an inmate has

no constitutional right to the information in his parole file” is beside the point. Mr.

has the

right to access his own case records and the materials considered by the Board. See Division of
Parole Regulations § 8000.5; Clark, 2018 WL 1988851, at *3. This is an improper application of
the Parole Board Regulations, 9 NYCRR § 8000.5, and is grounds for granting a de novo hearing.

C.

The Board’s Decision Denies Parole in Conclusory Terms and Fails to
Identify Reasons for Denial in Violation of Executive Law 259-i and Its
Regulations

The Board’s decision is deficient on its face because it fails to explain the Board’s

application of the statutory factors in non-conclusory terms, and fails to explain its departure from
the COMPAS assessment, pointing to Mr.

[s “presentation,” which is vague and, in any case,

not a statutory factor for consideration. The Court should therefore grant Mr.

a de novo

hearing, or immediate release to Community Supervision.

1.

Failure to explain decision in non-conclusory terms.

Under the Parole Board regulations, “[r]easons for the denial of parole release shall be

given in detail, and shall, in factually individualized and non-conclusory terms, address how the

applicable parole decision-making principles and factors listed in 8002.2 were considered in the

individual’s case.” 9 NYCRR § 8002.3(b). The Board’s decision must consist of more than a
“simple regurgitation of standard boilerplate [] language,” Ciaprazi v. Evans , 52 Misc. 3d 1212(A)
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016), and must contain enough detail “to permit intelligent judicial review.” West

v. New York State Bd. of Parole , 41 Misc. 3d 1214(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013). The Board must

articulate the reasons for its decisions in a reasonable manner to enable a court to reconstruct the
rationale behind the Board’s decision. See id.
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The Board’s November 2018 decision denying Mr.

parole consists primarily of

standard, boilerplate language and provides no clarity as to how it reached its decision. The

decision lists the materials the Board members reviewed, but provides no substantive analysis, in
violation of Executive Law and Parole Board regulations. See Ex. 1, Nov. 2018 Decision, at 2
(“We have reviewed your case plan, your release plans, official letters in support and opposition,

and your risk and needs assessment which indicates your lower risk and needs.”); see also Exec.

Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Rossakis v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22, 28 (1st Dep’t

2016) (“The Board summarily listed petitioner’s institutional achievements, and then denied parole

with no further analysis of them, in violation of the Executive Law’s requirement that the reasons
for denial not be given in ‘conclusory terms’”).

A third of the decision consists almost entirely of the statutory language of Executive Law

§ 259-i(2)(c)(A). In the November 2018 decision, the Board states:

Despite your low risk scores and improved discipline, the panel is concerned that
based on your presentation you have not developed the tools to live a law abiding
life. As such this panel is not convinced that you would live and remain at liberty
without violating the law. Your release remains incompatible with the welfare of
society and would deprecate the heinous nature of these crimes as to undermine
respect for the law.
Ex. 1 at 3. The Board’s decision does not include the required “individualized” rationale or

demonstrate any consideration or weighing of the statutory factors. Without any explanation or

application of the facts to the legal standard, the Board’s decision contains nothing but “conclusory
assertions” that fail to provide a basis upon which the court could review the Board’s decision.
See Rossakis , 146 A.D.3d at 28. The decision “merely states in a perfunctory fashion” information

considered, “without articulating any explanation for how [that information was] applied.”
Menard v. New York State Bd. of Parole , 2019 WL 1115731, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019).
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The Appeals Unit decision states only that “[t]he Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set

out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the

reasons for the denial of parole.” See Ex. 19 at 2. The Appeals Unit does not address the Board’s
inappropriate usage of statutory language or lack of engagement with the facts of Mr.

s case.

^

Mr.
is therefore entitled to a de novo interview on this basis alone. See id.; see also
|

West , 41 Misc. 3d at *4 (awarding a de novo hearing where the Parole Board’s decision was

insufficiently detailed to permit “intelligent” judicial review of the Board’s rationale).

.

2

.

Failure to explain departure from COMPAS

Moreover, Parole Board Regulations require that, where a “Board determination, denying

release, departs from the Department Risk and Needs Assessment scores, the Board shall specify

any scale within the Department Risk and Needs Assessment from which it departed and provided

an individualized reason for such departure

9 NYCRR § 8002.2 (emphasis added). The mere

existence of a COMPAS report in an applicant’s file is not enough

— the Board must actually

consider the substance of an applicant’s COMPAS report to properly assess the likelihood of the
applicant’s success upon release. See Diaz v. New York State Bd. of Parole , 42 Misc. 3d 532, 536
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (“There must be some indication that the Board complied with the statute by

considering the results of the COMPAS in reaching its decision.”). On Mr.
report, Mr.

s 2018 COMPAS

was scored as “low risk” for felony violence, arrest, and absconding, scores

consistent with those of his prior three assessments. See Ex. 13, COMPAS 2018; Ex. 12,
COMPAS 2017; Ex. 11, COMPAS 2015; Ex. 10, COMPAS 2013. In both the November 2018

decision and the parole interview, the Board acknowledged that Mr.

's

COMPAS Risk

Assessment scores were “on the lower end.” See Ex. 1 at 3; Ex. 2, Nov. 2018 Interview Transcript,

at 24. Mr.

’s application for release was nonetheless denied, without the Board identifying
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the portions of the COMPAS reports from which it diverged or explaining why it was departing

from the assessment.
The Board’s rationale refers only vaguely to Mr.
what about Mr.

^^

^^

s “presentation,” without explaining

s presentation - the substance of what he said, the way he appeared, or

something else - led the Board to believe he has “not developed the tools to live a law abiding

life.” This does not permit intelligent review of the Board’s decision to deny parole, and shows
“irrationality bordering on impropriety.”5 See Comfort v. New York State Div. of Parole, 68

A.D.3d 1295, 1297 (3d Dep’t 2009) (requiring a new hearing where the Board’s actions and

ultimate decision were so irrational under the circumstances they bordered on misconduct).
The Appeals Unit claims that the Board’s decision did provide an explanation: that the
Board “believes the appellant is likely to reoffend, and his distrust of law enforcement.” See Ex

19, at 5. First, one of those reasons is simply a departure from Mr.

assertion that Mr.

’s Risk Assessment. The

is “likely to reoffend” stands in direct contradiction with his COMPAS

report. See Ex. 13. The Board’s decision does not provide any rationale as to why the Board

believes Mr.

’s COMPAS assessment is inaccurate; it only states that it is. This is not an

explanation that permits intelligent review of the Board’s decision, as Mr.

is entitled to by

law. See West , 41 Misc. 3d 1214(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013). Second, as discussed in greater detail
below, the Board’s assertion that Mr.

“distrusts] law enforcement authority” is (a) contrary

to the record; and (b) not an appropriate factor or single reason to deny release.
The Appeals Unit cites to no case law that actually supports its assertion that “[m]istrust of

authority is a factor the Board is allowed to consider.” See Ex. 19, at 2. Instead, the Appeals Unit

cites to Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (2014),
To the extent that the Board believed that Mr.
had exhibited in his presentation a “continual mistrust of
authority,” Ex. 1 at 3, that determination is contrary to Mr,
s statements, see infra Section D.l .

5
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which makes no mention of the Board’s ability to consider an applicant’s distrust of authority and
in fact upholds the Board’s decision because the Board had not - unlike the case here - “considered
factors outside the score of the applicable statute.” Id. at 1273.

Here, in its original decision, the Board either considered the COMPAS Risk Assessment
and departed from it without providing individualized reasons, as required by law, or the Board
noted that the COMPAS Risk Assessment existed but failed to use it in making its determination

.

- in either case, Mr |

|is entitled to a de novo parole hearing. See 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a); Diaz ,

42 Misc. 3d 532; Matter of Garfield v. Evans, 108 A.D.3d 830 (3d Dep’t 2013) (Board’s failure to

use a COMPAS Risk Assessment entitles a parole applicant to a new hearing).
D.

The Board Improperly Considered Factors Outside of the Record Based on
Misapprehended Facts

Furthermore, the Executive Law, the Parole Board’s regulations, and New York courts are
clear that a decision denying release cannot be based upon inaccurate information. See 9 NYCRR

§ 8006.3(a)(2); Smith v. New York State Bd. of Parole , 34 A.D.3d 1156, 1157 (3d Dep’t 2006);

Lewis v. Travis, 9 A.D.3d 800, 801 (3d Dep’t 2004); Brazil v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 76
A.D.2d 864, 864 (2d Dep’t 1980). In this case, because the Board relied on inaccurate information
and considered factors outside of those set forth by law, a de novo interview is required.

1.

statements that
The Board relied on its characterizations of
was both improperly considered and factually incorrect

The Board’s conclusions about Mr.

’s “continual mistrust of authority” went beyond

the scope of the statutory factors outlined in Section 259 of the Executive Law but, more

importantly, inaccurately characterize Mr.

J s statements during his interview.

^

’

First, although

the Board has wide discretion, it is not authorized to consider extraneous factors or insert additional

expectations about what a parole applicant must do to deserve parole. See In re King v. New York
State Div. of Parole , 83 N.Y. 2d 788 (1994); see also Duffy v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. &
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Cmty. Supervision , 132 A.D.3d 1207, 1209 (3d Dep’t 2015) (“The Board cannot [] rely on factors

outside the scope of the statute in reaching its decision.”). “Trust in law enforcement” and
“mistrust of authority” are not included in or related to the statutory factors relevant to deciding
whether an applicant should be release to parole supervision. See Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).
Even if it were proper for the Board to consider Mr.

’s beliefs about law enforcement

and authority, as the Appeals Unit suggests, the Board’s “concem[]” about Mr.|

’s “statements

concerning law enforcement and continual mistrust of authority,” see Ex. 1 at 2-3, contradicts Mr.
’s statements during his interview and his record of utilizing the judicial system. Throughout

his November 2018 interview, the Board questioned Mr.

’s reluctance to contact the

authorities in the past. See Ex. 2 at 10, 12. In response to these questions, Mr.

I assured the

Board that he would call the police for any reason in the future. See id. at 34 (“[I]t’s for real. It’s

a good system, I finally learned that I can call 911 . . . I can still establish it and use it and try to
help.”). In addition, Mr.

has repeatedly sought relief from administrative and judicial

authorities by filing appeals of his parole hearings, see Ex. 9, Ex. 14, and by filing judicial actions
based on his mistreatment in prison at the hands of correctional officers. Still, the Board concluded

that Mr.

's

“presentation” at his interview suggested he did not trust law enforcement and

would be unable to lead a law-abiding life. See Ex. 1 at 3.

Mistakes and reliance on mischaracterizations or distortions of an interview record
necessitate a de novo hearing. See Wallman v. Travis , 18 A.D.3d 304, 309 (1st Dep’t 2005)
(Board’s reasons for denial were flawed because of inaccuracies in Board’s conclusions regarding

petitioner’s remorse expressed at his hearing); Hughes v. NYS Div. of Parole , 21 A.D.3d 1176,
1177 (3d Dep’t 2005) ( de novo interview granted where the Board erroneously referred to the

petitioner’s youthful offender adjudication as a prior felony); Plevy v. Travis , 17 A.D.3d 879, 880
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(3d Dep’t 2005) (Board erroneously cited to a prior probation violation which had been

dismissed).6
2.

The Board relied on a letter of opposition from an Assistant District
Attorney who did not prosecute Mr.

In this case, the Board relied on a letter of opposition submitted by an Assistant District

Attorney who was not involved in Mr.

s trial. In 2015, DOCCS solicited letters from Mr.

s sentencing judge, Judge John A. Dillon and Mr.

s defense attorney,

. See Ex. 15, DOCCS Solicitation Letters 2015, at 1, 3. There is no evidence in Mr.

Is parole file that any of the prosecutors of Mr.
, and A.D.A.
during Mr.

s trial, D.A.

, A.D.A.

, were ever contacted by DOCCS. However,

s November 2018 interview, the Board acknowledged that it reviewed “the

statement from the district attorney.” Ex. 2 at 29. On information and belief, the letter relied on
by the Board was submitted by a different Assistant District Attorney who did not prosecute Mr.
7

That Assistant District Attorney’s name does not appear in the sentencing minutes or any

other document in Mr.

s parole file.

Contrary to the Appeals Unit’s assertion, the Board cannot consider an official letter of

opposition submitted by an Assistant District Attorney who did not participate in the original trial

or sentencing. See Clark , 2018 WL 1988851, at *4-5 (finding that the Board’s reliance an official

ofMr. H’s statements taking responsibility for the crimes committed
as a teenager who was influenced by drugs and alcohol. Ex, 1 at 2 (“You stated you take responsibility for his death
although you disagree with the medical evidence.”). This is also a mistake or mischaracterization of Mr.|
Is
statements. The hearing transcript reveals that Mr.
ias recognized that his actions led to the death of Mr.|
for which he takes full responsibility, notwithstanding medical evidence. See Ex. 2 at 21- (“I’ve been saying it since
when I found out and realized and became mature that it doesn’t matter how the individual had expired. It doesn’t
matter what our medical science puts forth , , , the individual is deceased. I take full responsibility for that.”)
6 The Board’s decision also appears skeptical

^

^^^

’s undersigned attorney. However, M r.
letter was not in the parole file released to Mr.
w a s given onetime access to his file since the time of his parole hearing at which time he saw the unredacted letter from the district
attorney. He never received the letter, and only saw it one time. This information is therefore based on Mr.
Is
representations about the letter.

7 This

^^B
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statement submitted by a judge who was not the original sentencing judge was improper). The
relevant language in the statute governing the Board of Parole states that the Board may give due

consideration of the “recommendations of the sentencing court, the district attorney, [and] the
attorney for the inmate...” N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i (c)(A). There is no express allowance in the

regulation that permits Assistant District Attorneys who are “not personally involved in the case”
to submit recommendations as the Appeals Unit suggests. In fact, the Appeals Unit cites no

authorities that would allow for such a submission or where the Board is permitted to give it due
consideration. This letter, submitted by an Assistant District Attorney with no direct connection

to the case or special knowledge of the underlying facts, consists of nothing more than general

opposition disguised as an official statement by a government official.
E.

The Board Placed Improper Weight on the Underlying Offense to the
Exclusion of Other Statutory Factors

The Board cannot base its decision to deny an applicant’s release solely on the nature or

.

seriousness of the crime. See, e.g. Matter of Ramirez v. Evans , 118 A.D.3d 707, 707 (2d Dep’t
2014); Matter of Gelsomino v. New York State Bd. of Parole , 82 A.D.3d 1097, 1098 (2d Dep’t
2011); Rossakis , 146 A.D.3d at 27; In re Perfetto v. Evans , 112 A.D.3d 640, 641 (2d Dep’t 2013).
Where there is evidence the Parole Board placed undue emphasis on the nature or

seriousness of the applicant’s crime, at the expense of genuine consideration of other aspects of
the applicant’s case for parole, the Board’s decision does not comport with the statutory

requirements. See Menard, 2019 WL 1115731, at *4; Morris v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. &
Cmty. Supervision , 40 Misc. 3d 226, 233 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013).

The only detailed and particularized section of the Board’s November 2018 decision refers

exclusively to the underlying offense and Mr.

’s actions 35 years ago. The decision

characterizes the underlying offense as a “brutal murder and assault of [the] victim” and also
21
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includes that the “victim was beaten, slashed, and then marched to a location and dumped in a
manhole.” See Ex. 1 at 3. By contrast, there is no substantive discussion regarding Mr.

s

rehabilitation, his many accomplishments during his incarceration, the multiple letters of support
Mr.

has received, or his thorough release and re-entry plan. The transcript of the underlying

November 2018 interview shows that the Board members focused on the decades-old crime,

asking Mr.

questions about how Mr.

victim’s death, and Mr.|

knew the victim, the particulars regarding the

s interpretation of the medical autopsy report, which amount to half

of the transcript. See Ex. 2 at 8-24.8
The Appeals Unit’s decision followed suit. Two of the first three sentences are graphic

descriptions of the offense, used to support yet another denial for Mr.
There is no discussion related to Mr.

|’s release. Ex. 19, at 1.

|s accomplishments and rehabilitation.

The Appeals

Unit correctly recites that the Board “is permitted to consider, and place greater emphasis on, the
brutal and heinous nature of the offense.” Ex. 19, at 2. However, the Appeals Unit refuses to
acknowledge that this was the only statutory factor the Board emphasized in Mr.

s case and

that while the weight given to every statutory factor is within the Board’s discretion, the Board

cannot deny release solely on the basis of the petitioner’s offense. See Cappiello v. New York State
Bd. of Parole, 2004 WL 3112629 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
The contrast between the Board’s interest in Mr.

shrift the Board gave to Mr.

J’s historical actions, and the short

^

’s rehabilitation and future plans to live a law-abiding life,

demonstrate that the Board acted improperly. See Menard , 2019 WL 1115731, at *4 (parole
' s parole interviews regularly consist of long discussions regarding the underlying offense and, because Mr.
Mr.|
|has already completed all required programming, discussions about his plans for release have gotten shorter over
time. Therefore, each subsequent interview improperly focuses on a different aspect of the crime rather than on Mr.
Is future. See, e.g., Ex. 3, Nov. 2011 Parole Hearing Transcript; Ex. 4, Sept. 2013 Parole Hearing Transcript; Ex.
5, Jan. 2014 Parole Hearing Transcript; Ex. 6, Nov. 2015 Parole Hearing Transcript; Ex. 7, May 2017 Parole Hearing
Transcript; Ex. 8, Jan. 2018 Parole Hearing Transcript. Counsel did not receive copies of the 2008 or 2009 Parole
Hearing transcripts as part of Mr.
ts parole file.
6

^^
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applicant entitled to de novo hearing where “Board focused on the seriousness of [the] crime
without giving genuine consideration to petitioner’s remorse, institutional achievements, release
plan, and [] lack of any prior violent criminal history”) (internal marks and citations omitted);
Perfetto, 112 A.D.3d at 640 (parole applicant was entitled to a new interview where despite

mentioning the applicant’s institutional record, the Board denied release solely on the basis of the

seriousness of the underlying offense); Cappiello , 2004 WL 3112629 (Board’s unjustifiable reliance
solely on the severity of the crime exceeded its administrative discretion and was contrary to law).
For example, the Board should take into account that Mr.

is involved in many activities at

Auburn Correctional Facility that demonstrate both institutional achievements, such as

participation in a new inmate program called the Inmate Tablet Program-JP5S, and release plan,
based on his regular visits with parole support system staff. Mr.

is entitled to de novo

interview so that all of the statutory factors can be genuinely and fairly considered.
F.

The Board’s Denial of Mr.
Parole was Excessive, Contrary to Law,
Resentencing
and Amounts to Illegal

The Board’s repeated denial of Mr.

’s parole amounts to unlawful resentencing. Mr.

was sentenced by a judge to 25 years to life in prison with the possibility of parole. Mr.
has been imprisoned for a total of 36 years, more than two-thirds of his life. The role of the Parole
Board is not to resentence the petitioner, but to determine whether, at the time petitioner is before
the Board, given all the statutory factors, he should be released. See King , 190 A.D.2d at 598. For
the judge’s sentence to be given meaning, the Board should provide an articulable reason for Mr.

J was not afforded parole. Instead, the Board has

^

’s continued confinement such that Mr.

given no reasons for its denial and has offered no guidance as to how Mr.

Jcan improve his

^^

chances of being released to parole supervision. The Appeals Unit contests that the Board has any
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obligation to tell a petitioner how to “improve his changes for parole in the future.” See Ex. 19, at
4. But this stance leaves Mr.
Mr.

jwith no path forward.

has completed all of the available programs and has maintained a job in prison

during his 35-year confinement. He complied with every requirement the Board set forth and was
still denied ten times. Because the Board has deviated from the statutory scheme by disregarding
the significant work and resultant success in rehabilitation and Mr.

’$ low-risk assessment for

release (as explained above), the Board’s decision amounts to illegal resentencing. In effect, the

|
.
Parole Board has unlawfully transformed Mr
’s sentence to 25 years to life in prison with no

^

.

possibility ofparole - subverting the plain decision of the original sentencing judge. Mr

must now remain incarcerated an additional 18 months in prison before his next opportunity for
release.9 See Wallman, 18 A.D.3d at 307-08; Cappiello , 2004 WL 3112629 at *8.

G.

The “Deprecate the Seriousness of His Crime” Standard Is
Unconstitutionally Vague

The Executive Law states that discretionary release on parole shall only be granted “after

considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release

...

will not so deprecate the

seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for /aw.” Exec. Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis
added). Neither the Parole Board Regulations nor case law has construed the meaning of this
standard and the “deprecate the seriousness of his crime” standard is unconstitutionally vague.

Vagueness is evaluated using a two-part test. People v. Nelson, 69 N.Y.2d 302, 307 (1987).
First, one must determine “whether the statute in question is sufficiently definite to give a person

^^

For 11 years, the Board has repeatedly denied Mr. Vs release, thereby extending his sentence far beyond the
minimum of that to which he was sentenced by a judge. Twice before, Mr.
has proven that Board failed to
properly fulfill its obligations and received two de novo hearings once for the Board’s failure to conduct a COMPAS
assessment for Mr. l, and a second for its failure to properly address his age at the time of the offense in violation
of the Eighth Amendment. See Ex. 9; Ex. 17, 2013 Article 78 Decision Requiring De Novo Interview for Failure to
Conduct COMPAS Assessment.
9

^^

—
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of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden.” People v. Stuart ,

100 N.Y.2d 412, 420 (2003). Second, the statute must “provide officials with clear standards for
enforcement” so as to avoid “resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” Stuart , 100 N.Y.2d at 421 (<quoting Groyned

v. City ofRocltford , 408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972)). The “deprecate the seriousness of his crime”
standard is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to give fair notice to prisoners of what behavior

will result in denial of parole, and leaves the Board with no guidance so as to avoid arbitrary
enforcement; its application is inherently arbitrary and capricious. People v. Bright , 71 N.Y.2d

376, 379 (1988) (a statute is “unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clauses of the
Federal and State Constitutions [where] it fails to give fair notice to the ordinary citizen that the

prohibited conduct is illegal, [and] it lacks minimal legislative guidelines, thereby permitting
arbitrary enforcement”).
Mr.

|’s denial is an unreasonable result generated by this unconstitutionally vague

standard, because there are no explanations as to why granting Mr.

parole would “so

deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law.” Ex. 1 at 3. Mr.

was

sentenced, by law, to a 25-year sentence with the possibility of parole, and he has been in prison

for more than 35 years. It is unreasonable and irrational for the Parole Board to conclude that
parole itself would undermine respect for the law or minimize the seriousness of the offense when
Mr.

^^

has served the minimum sentence required before being eligible for parole and has
|

completed all programing recommended by DOCCS and the Board of Parole.

CONCLUSION
For each reason stated above, and the combination of those reasons, Mr.

respectfully

requests that this Court grant his Petition and reverse the denial of parole, order Respondents to
hold a de novo parole hearing according to law and based on a current and complete record, within
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thirty days of this Court’s decision, Rabenbauer v. New York State Dep’t of Corn & Cmty.

Supervision , 41 Misc. 3d 1235(A), 983, N.Y.S.2d 206 (Sup. Ct. 2013)), or in the alternative, grant
Mr.

immediate release to Community Supervision and to grant any other relief as this Court

may deem appropriate.
Dated: New York, New York
November 2, 2019
Respectfully submitted,

By: s/Johanna Rae Hudgens

Ross M. Kramer, Esq.
Johanna Rae Hudgens, Esq.

WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
The MetLife Building, 200 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10166
Tel: (212) 294-6734
rkramer@winston.com
jhudgens@winston.com

Attorneys for Petitioner
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